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rAbstract
Mobile workers involve flows of labor and human capital and contribute to a more
efficient allocation of resources. However, migration also changes relative wages,
alters the distribution of skills and affects equality in the receiving society. The paper
suggests that skilled immigration promotes economic equality in advanced
economies under standard conditions. This is discussed and theoretically derived in a
core model, and empirically supported using unique data from the WIID database
and OECD.
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Economic migration involves flows of labor, human capital, and other production fac-
tors. At least in theory, it contributes to a more efficient allocation of resources and a
larger welfare of nations. However, the distributional effects of migration may change
the skill composition of labor in the receiving and sending countries. This is the case
if, for example, a country experiences a steady inflow of workers whose skill level is on
average higher than the skill level of the average native worker. The induced changes
in the labor force have the direct effects on inequality through changing the shares of
“poor” and “rich” people in the economy, as long as skills are correlated with wealth.
They affect the wages of high and low skilled labor in the economy. Individuals may
react to such changes in labor force quality by changing their investment decisions, in-
cluding those regarding their investment into human capital acquisition. As another
example, low skill immigration may increase the overall quality of the labor force, if it
brings about a larger increase in the quality of the native labor force. We measure the
quality of the labor force by the incidence of skilled workers in it. We define skilled
and unskilled workers by their highest attained levels of education, albeit we under-
stand that skill is a broader category than education.
The economic consequences of migration have been one of the central topics of
labor economics since Chiswick (1978, 1980) and Borjas (1983, 1985). While various
distributional effects have been considered in the ensuing literature summarized in
Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009), there is little empirical evidence on the relationship
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and Zimmermann, 2009; Epstein, 2013).
We consider the relationships between economic inequality, the quality of the labor
force, and international migration from the perspective of developed countries receiv-
ing inflows of migrants. We first start from Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) to link
inequality to the share of skilled workers in the labor force. In the Appendix, we prove
in a theoretical framework that skilled immigration promotes income equality. We
econometrically investigate the relationship between (i) labor force quality and immi-
gration and (ii) inequality and labor force quality using country statistics from the
OECD Statistical Compendium and a unique compilation of inequality data provided
by the WIDER institute at the United Nations University. We find evidence supporting
the hypothesis that skilled immigration supports equality.
2. A mathematical analysis
We consider an economy with a labor force of size one with L low-skilled workers
earning wages wl and S = 1 – L high-skilled workers earning wages wh. We define θ =
wl/wh. L denotes also the share of low-skilled workers. For a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) production function C ¼ L1−ρ þ αSð Þ1−ρ  11−ρ , where ρ = 1/ε and ε > 0 is
the (finite) elasticity of substitution of high- and low-skilled labor in a competitive in-
dustry and α > 1 is the efficiency shift factor of skilled relative to unskilled labor, θ = (L/
(α(1 − L)))− ρ and the earnings of an unskilled relative to a skilled worker are θ/α. When
high-skilled workers earn more than low-skilled workers, θ/α < 1.
The Gini coefficient is the area between the line of perfect equality, the 45 degree
line, and the Lorenz curve z (λ), depicting the share of economy’s income accruing to
the λ poorest individuals, divided by the area between the line of perfect equality and
the line of perfect inequality. The line of perfect inequality attains zero for any λ ∈ [0, 1)
and z(1) = 1. In the Appendix, we show that the Gini coefficient is
G Lð Þ ¼ L 1−Lð Þ α− α 1−Lð Þð Þ
ρ=Lρð Þ
α−αLþ α 1−Lð Þð Þρ=Lρ−1 ð1Þ
and that there is a nondegenerate range [L1, L2], where values L1 and L2 satisfy 0 ≤ L1 ≤
L2 ≤ 1, on which G(L) is increasing in L. Whenever ε ∈ (0, 1], dG(L)/dL > 0 for any L ∈
(0, 1). For ε > 1, G(L) is increasing within and decreasing outside of [L1, L2]. The range
[L1, L2] is large. For example, if the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor is
about 2.5, as estimated by Chiswick (1978b), and high skilled labor is twice as product-
ive as its low skilled counterpart, the corresponding values L1 = 0.07 and L2 = 0.83. This
is further corroborated by Table 1, which provides the values of L1 and L2 for a range
of values of ε. Parametric values determine which L ∈ (0, 1) are admissible with respect
to the condition θ/α < 1 and which are not. We denote L* the value of L, where θ/α = 1.Table 1 The range of L for which G(L) is increasing
ε ε ≤ 1 1.1 2.5 5 10 100 ε→∞
L1 0 0.02 0.07 0.02 0 0 0
L2 1 0.98 0.83 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.59
Source: Own calculations; α = 2.
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* < L2, and θ/α < 1 for
any L ∈ (L*, 1) and θ/α > 1 for any L ∈ (0, L*). If ε > 1 (ε ∈ (0, 1)), it must be that L < 0.5
(L > 0.5) for θ/α < 1 to hold. L* = 0.26 if ε = 2.5 and α = 2 as in the example above. For
the values of L ∈ (0, L*), the Gini coefficient equals –G(L): for OECD economies with a
large share of skilled labor, the relevant segment of G(L) is decreasing in the share 1-L
of skilled labor, for the most part and may become decreasing in 1-L for L ∈ (0, L*),
where, counterfactually, the low-skilled earn more than the high-skilled.
This enables us to consider the effects of changes in L that occur when immigrants
of different skill composition from that of natives enter or leave the country under the
conditions of flexible wages. For example, for L ∈ (L*, L2), an inflow of immigrants who
are on average more skilled than the natives decreases inequality, in case of ε > 1. We
then predict that inequality is decreasing with skilled immigration, or more generally
immigration that increases the quality of the labor force, for moderate to high values
and may be increasing for very high values of the share 1-L of skilled labor. In OECD
countries where skilled labor is abundant and earns more than unskilled labor, skilled
immigration should decrease inequality.
Skills develop with age, and age and migration are related through the migration
decision. Therefore, skilled immigrants may first not directly compete with natives,
since they are typically male, young and often over-skilled for the job they do. Their
interaction with natives also depends on their willingness of investing in country-
specific knowledge and human capital. Natives may also react with educational
decisions. Hence, skilled immigrants can increase the share of skilled workers in the
country right upon arrival, but also after they or the natives adjust.
In a similar way, even mixed or less-skilled immigration may increase the average
skill level in the receiving labor market through immigrants’ or natives’ adjustment. Na-
tives may react not only ex post by adjusting their educational or training decisions,
but also before actual immigration takes place in expectation of increased labor market
competition.
3. Empirical specification and data
The relationship between inequality, the quality of the labor force, and migration is
modeled using a recursive econometric specification of the following type:
G ¼ f 1 S;Xð Þ þ μG ð2Þ
S ¼ f 2 F ;Zð Þ þ μS ð3Þ
G stands for inequality measured as the Gini coefficient, S is the share of skilled laborforce as in our theoretical model, and F is the share of foreigners in the labor force
measuring migration. X and Z are vectors of contextual variables, and μG and μS are
error terms. Equation (2) captures the derived trade-off between inequality and educa-
tional attainment, while Equation (3) measures the optimal relationship between the
share of skilled workers in an economy and the share of foreign labor of total employ-
ment resulting from the standard firm optimization principle.
What is the empirical relationship between inequality and educational attainment
levels in the labor force? To address this question, we combine data on education,
labor force characteristics and other national indicators from the OECD Statistical
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Database (WIID 2007) version 2.0b compiled by the WIDER institute at the United
Nations University and published in May 2007. The OECD Statistical Compendium
provides statistics on labor force characteristics, national accounts, and education,
mainly for developed country members of OECD.
The WIID 2007 dataset reports Gini coefficients for many countries covering many
years of collection and estimation of this inequality indicator. In those cases where
WIID 2007 reports multiple Gini coefficients per year and country, we prefer those of
the highest quality if based on gross rather than net takings and earnings rather than
broader measures of income to quantify those components of economic inequality that
stem from the labor market as precisely as possible. Whether earnings inequality is
measured at the individual or household level is a non-trivial issue in the context of
measuring the relationship between inequality and immigration. In particular, immi-
grants often have larger households and different family structures than natives.
Measures of inequality based on individual and household earnings may give different
pictures of inequality. We control for individual against household level at which the
Gini coefficient was measured. The combined dataset covers 29 OECD member states
and provides 109 observations with non-missing information on the Gini coefficient
and the shares of the labor force with at least upper secondary or post-secondary
education. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean Gini
coefficient is 32%, the mean share of workers with upper secondary or higher education
is 73%, the corresponding figure for post-secondary or higher education is 51%, and the
mean share of foreigners in the labor force is about 7%.4. Labor force quality and migration
Figures 1 and 2 showing line plots of nonparametric locally weighted regressions reveal
that inequality is mostly a negative function of labor force quality for both quality
measures that we apply. Indeed, this relationship is negative for about 80% of theTable 2 Descriptive statistics of key dependent and independent variables
Mean Standard deviation Number of observations
Gini coefficient 31.95 6.14 109
Share of upper secondary or higher education 72.84 17.17 109
Share of post-secondary or higher education 50.64 20.26 109
Share of foreign labor force 5.11 3.85 110
Inflation rate 2.63 2.50 109
Share of population 15–64 years of age 66.86 1.56 109
Unemployment rate 7.49 3.53 109
Women’s unemployment rate 8.37 4.61 109
Participation rate 73.01 6.24 109
Women’s participation rate 65.00 8.44 109
Share of labor force in agriculture 5.68 4.00 109
Government size 20.25 3.38 109
GDP per capita, 1000s USD 19.95 12.15 109
The share of foreign labor force computed for the sample including observations with missing information on the Gini
coefficient but excluding Luxembourg, which has a high share of foreigners.
Figure 1 Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of labor force with upper
secondary or higher education. OECD members except for Iceland. Data on Gini coefficients are from the
WIID 2007 database. Data on the shares of labor force with given education are from the OECD
Compendium. 1992–2003. Line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient
as a function of the share of labor force with upper secondary or higher education.
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centage for upper secondary or higher education is about 60%. The relationships are
not too different from simple quadratic fits.
Before we scrutinize the relationship between labor force quality and inequality more
deeply, we first investigate how labor force quality relates to migration. Figures 3 and 4Figure 2 Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of labor force with post-secondary
or higher education. OECD members except for Iceland and Mexico. Data sources see Figure 1. 1992–2003. Line
plot of the nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of labor
force with post-secondary or higher education.
Figure 3 Scatter plot of the share of labor force with upper secondary or higher education as a
function of the share of foreigners in the labor force. OECD members. Data on the shares of labor force
with given education and foreigners are from the OECD Compendium. 1992–2003. Line plot of the
nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient on the share of labor force with upper
secondary or higher education.
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higher educational attainment is a predominantly positive function of the share of foreign
labor force in the economy, while the same relationship is monotonously increasing in case
of post-secondary or higher education.
To consider this relationship (Equation 3) as a causal phenomenon requires account-
ing for the endogeneity of the decision of migration, the effects of migration on the
educational attainment of the native labor force, and the skill level of the immigrants
relative to native workers. While such causal evaluation would require a much more
detailed dataset than we have, we evaluate the association between the share of foreign
labor force and its quality controlling for a number of potential covariates such as the
size of the government and the age composition of the labor force.
Table 3 contains our findings. The sample included also those observations for which
the information on the Gini coefficient was missing. Luxembourg was dropped from
the analysis due to its unusually high share of foreigners. The results are robust with
respect to inclusion of Luxembourg. The analysis strongly confirms that the quality of
the labor force increases with the share of foreigners in the labor force. This finding is
valid for all econometric models and for any measure of education (post-secondary or
higher and upper-secondary or higher) that we have considered. It is also robust with
respect to the fixed effects model specification as well as for the restricted sample of
observations for which the Gini coefficient is available.
Government size as well as GDP per head have positive effects on the quality of labor
force in the OLS models in columns 2 and 5 of Table 3, but these effects have a differ-
ent sign in the random effects models. This reversal is consistent with the hypothesis
that the association of these variables is positive between but negative within countries.
Figure 4 Scatter plot of the share of labor force with post-secondary or higher education as a
function of the share of foreigners in the labor force. OECD members. Data sources see Figure 3,
1992–2003. Line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient on the share
of labor force with post-secondary or higher education.
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The question that remains to be addressed is whether inequality indeed tends to be a
negative function of labor force quality as suggested by our theoretical argument as
well as Figures 1 and 2. We therefore now estimate Equation 2, accounting for a num-
ber of potential confounding factors. Besides the distribution of educational levels in
the labor force, Katz and Murphy (1992) report that increased demand for skilled
workers and women as well as changes in the allocation of labor between industriesTable 3 Share higher education as a function of share foreign labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upper secondary and higher Post-secondary and higher
OLS OLS Random effects OLS OLS Random effects
Share of foreign labor force 0.91** 1.14** 0.65** 2.62** 2.88** 1.43**
(0.29) (0.30) (0.23) (0.33) (0.43) (0.42)
Share of population 15-64 years
of age
1.99 −0.16 1.85 −0.16
(1.57) (0.46) (1.77) (0.86)
Government size 1.79** −0.57** 1.38* −1.58**
(0.56) (0.27) (0.76) (0.50)
GDP per capita, 1000 s USD 0.68** −0.00 0.47** −0.13**
(0.14) (0.03) (0.18) (0.06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 66.28** −112.35 85.60** 37.51** −110.04 87.21
(2.75) (115.00) (34.39) (2.71) (128.11) (63.90)
Observations 110 110 109 110 110 109
R-squared 0.04 0.27 0.73a 0.22 0.30 0.52a
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%.
aWithin R-squared.
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(1999) provide evidence that the share of industry in employment, per head gross domestic
product, international trade, the relative size of the public expenditures, as well as the
demographic structure of the population affect inequality measured by the Gini coefficient
across countries and years. Topel (1994) finds that technological and economic develop-
ment determines economic inequality.
We examine the effects of the aggregate and women’s labor force participation rates,
aggregate and women’s unemployment rates, share of the population between 15 and
64 years of age, labor force in the agricultural sector, share of the government in
the economy, defined as the expenditures of the central government divided by the
aggregate GDP, gross domestic product, and inflation rate. We control for the year,
country, and the method of computing the Gini coefficient, distinguishing various in-
come measures, net and gross figures and the unit of analysis used to calculate the Gini
coefficient.
Our regression analysis reported in Table 4 confirms that the observed decreasing
and convex relationship is robust for both considered measures of education and across
a number of model specifications, including the standard OLS model, the weighted
least squares model with quality weights for the Gini coefficient from the WIID
database, and the model with random country effects. This result remains robust in al-
ternative models with weighting by country size, clustering, and fixed effects. The coef-
ficients on post-secondary or higher education measure of labor force quality retain the
correct signs, but become insignificant in the fixed effect model. The share of educated
labor force is negatively and its square positively associated with inequality in all speci-
fications. The estimated coefficients yield the minimum of the U-shaped relationship
between the share of skilled labor and the Gini coefficient to lie at about 80% of the
labor force with upper secondary or higher education and 66% of the labor force with
post-secondary or higher education. In our sample these numbers imply a downward
sloping relationship between the share of skilled labor and inequality for 67% and 84%
of the observations for the two applied measures of skilled labor.
The aggregate unemployment rate is positively associated with inequality, but
women’s unemployment rate affects inequality negatively. The same should hold for
aggregate and women’s participation rates, but we do not find this. One reason could
be the effect of women’s selection into the labor force, whereby high women’s un-
employment and participation rates indicate that women with less favorable earnings
opportunities are joining the labor force, increasing the dispersion of earnings. The size
of the government, government spending as a percentage of GDP, is negatively
associated with inequality, which is consistent with the hypothesis that redistribution
decreases inequality.6. Conclusion
First, our theory predicts that inequality is decreasing in labor force quality for ad-
vanced economies under standard conditions. This effect is mainly a consequence of
the standard economic law of diminishing marginal product of production factors: as
the share of skilled workers in the economy increases, its value decreases and thus also
the wage differential between high and low skilled labor decreases. In our theoretical
Table 4 Gini coefficient as a function of labor force quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









Share of highly educated in the
labor force
−0.83** −0.75** −0.81** −0.31** −0.32** −0.29**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Share of highly educated in the
labor force, sq/100
0.56** 0.49** 0.54** 0.24** 0.24** 0.22*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Inflation rate 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.08
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28)
Share of population −0.52 −0.44 −0.60 −0.68 −0.44 −0.78
15-64 years of age (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.57) (0.51) (0.53)
Unemployment rate 2.95** 2.92** 2.95** 2.09** 2.19** 2.11**
(0.83) (0.52) (0.54) (0.71) (0.56) (0.59)
Women’s unemployment rate −1.87** −1.86** −1.88** −1.34** −1.42** −1.36**
(0.59) (0.39) (0.40) (0.53) (0.42) (0.44)
Participation rate 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.47 0.67* 0.54
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.34) (0.38) (0.41)
Women’s participation rate −0.31 −0.44 −0.35 −0.47* −0.59** −0.52*
(0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.24) (0.28) (0.30)
Share of labor force in agriculture −0.34 −0.29 −0.32* −0.20 −0.18 −0.16
(0.26) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19)
Government size −0.41 −0.36* −0.40** −0.43* −0.36* −0.41**
(0.25) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) (0.20)
GDP per capita, 1000 s USD 0.06 0.05 0.05 −0.08 −0.08 −0.10
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Gini definition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 115.40** 99.31** 118.89** 93.42** 68.78* 95.98**
(34.24) (34.20) (34.02) (40.97) (35.82) (37.06)
Observations 109 109 108 109 109 108
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.62
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%.
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force. In particular, inflows of workers with average skill level above that of the receiv-
ing country decrease inequality, and the opposite holds for low-skilled immigration.
Second, we confirm empirically that the relationship between inequality and the
quality of the labor force is predominantly negative. The econometric analysis account-
ing for many covariates confirms what already appears from the raw data. We show
that, in the sample of OECD countries, inequality decreases with a higher labor force
quality for most values of educational attainment; and a positive relationship shows up
for observations with the quality of the labor force above a certain high threshold level
as predicted by the theory.
Third, we empirically evaluated the relationship between migration and labor force
quality as observed across OECD countries. We find that the share of foreigners in the
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strongly positively associated. Given our finding that labor force quality and inequality
are negatively associated, this result implies that immigration is negatively associated
with inequality.
Appendix
Gini coefficient and immigration
Consider an economy of size 1 with L low-skilled earning wages wl and S = 1 – L high-
skilled workers earning wages wh. We denote θ =wl/wh and normalize the total income
to unity, wlL +wh(1 − L) = 1. Consider the case with endogenous wages such that θ =
(L/(α(1 − L)))− ρ where ρ > 0.
Proposition
For L ∈ ½α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ), 1) the Gini coefficient equals
G Lð Þ ¼ L 1−Lð Þ α− α 1−Lð Þð Þ
ρ=Lρð Þ
α−αLþ α 1−Lð Þð Þρ=Lρ−1 : ðA1Þ
For L ∈ (0, α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)] the Gini coefficient equals –G(L).
If ρ ≥ 1, dG(L)/dL > 0 for any L ∈ (0, 1).
For 0 < ρ < 1 and L ∈ (0, 1), there exist L1 ∈ (0, α
1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)) and L2 ∈ (α
1 − 1/ρ/
(1 + α1 − 1/ρ), 1) such that dG(L)/dL > 0 for L ∈ (L1, L2), dG(L)/dL < 0 for L ∈ (0, 1) − [L1, L2],
and dG(L)/dL = 0 for L ∈ {L1, L2}. Also, L1 < L
* < L2, where L
* = α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ).
Proof
Given θ = (L/(α(1 − L)))− ρ, L ∈ (α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ), 1) implies θ/α =wl/αwh < 1, that is,
high-skilled workers earn more than low-skilled ones. Then the Lorenz curve is defined
by
z λð Þ ¼ θλ
θLþ α 1−Lð Þ for λ∈ 0; L½  and ðA2Þ
z λð Þ ¼ θLþ α λ−Lð Þ
θLþ α 1−Lð Þ for λ∈ L; 1½  ðA3Þ
We integrate the Lorenz curve over λ ∈ [0, 1] and substitute for θ to obtain
G Lð Þ ¼ L 1−Lð Þ α− α 1−Lð Þð Þ
ρ=Lρð Þ
α−αLþ α 1−Lð Þð Þρ=Lρ−1 ðA4Þ




2 1−Lð Þ2L2ρ þ L2α2ρ 1−Lð Þ2ρ−αρþ1Lρ 1−Lð Þρ 1−ρ−2L 1−Lð Þð Þ
αρ 1−Lð ÞρLþ α 1−Lð ÞLρð Þ2
: ðA5Þ
If L ∈ (0, α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)), θ/α =wl/αwh > 1 and high-skilled workers earn less than
low-skilled ones. The Lorenz curve becomes
z λð Þ ¼ α 1−Lð Þ
θLþ α 1−Lð Þ for λ∈ 0; L½  and ðA6Þ
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θLþ α 1−Lð Þ for λ∈ L; 1½ : ðA7Þ
Integrating the Lorenz curve over λ ∈ [0, 1] we obtain that the Gini coefficient is –G(L).
L = α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ) is the case of perfect equality.
For ρ ≥ 1 we see from the expression for dG(L)/dL that this derivative is positive for
any L ∈ (0, 1).
For 0 < ρ < 1, first G(L) and dG(L)/dL are continuous functions for L ∈ (0, 1), G(L)→ 0
for L→ 1 or L→ 0 and substituting L = α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ) into G(L) in equation (A4)
yields G(α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)) = 0, because
lim
L→0þ
G Lð Þ ¼ lim
L→0þ
L1−ρ 1−Lð Þ αLρ− α 1−Lð Þð Þρð Þ
α−αLþ α 1−Lð Þð Þρ=Lρ−1 ¼ 0; and ðA8Þ
lim
L→1−
G Lð Þ ¼ lim
L→1−
L 1−Lð Þ1−ρ α− α 1−Lð Þð Þρ=Lρð Þ
α 1−Lð Þ1−ρ þ αρL1−ρ ¼ 0; ðA9Þ
where we made use of 0 < ρ < 1.
dG(L)/dL→ −∞ when L→ 1 or L→ 0 and substitution yields dG(L)/dL > 0 at L = α1− 1/ρ/
(1 + α1− 1/ρ). In fact, dG(L)/dL = ρ. This last result involves tedious algebra; one can show
this by evaluating dG(L)/dL at L*, simplifying it, and realizing that dG(L)/dL = 1 + f
(α, ρ)(ρ − 1) where the term f(α, ρ) = 1. These properties imply that there exists a
minimum of G(L) on the interval L ∈ (0, α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)) and a maximum on the
interval L ∈ (α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ), 1), where dG(L)/dL = 0.
To show the uniqueness of each and the maxima of dG(L)/dL, assume for the mo-
ment that α = 1; we extend the argument to the case where α > 1 below. First
d2G Lð Þ
dL2
¼ − ρ−1ð Þ L 1−Lð Þð Þ
ρ−1
−L 1−Lð Þρ þ Lρ L−1ð Þð Þ3 L
ρ 1−Lð Þ 2L−ρð Þ þ L 1−Lð Þρ 2Lþ ρ−2ð Þð Þ: ðA10Þ
ρ−1ð Þ L 1−Lð Þð Þρ−1The ratio
−L 1−Lð ÞρþLρ L−1ð Þð Þ3 is positive for 0 < ρ < 1 and L ∈ (0, 1), then the second de-
rivative has the sign of
− Lρ 1−Lð Þ 2L−ρð Þ þ L 1−Lð Þρ 2Lþ ρ−2ð Þð Þ: ðA11Þ
For 0 < ρ < 1 and L ∈ (0, 0.5), equation (A11) becomes






As 2L + ρ − 2 < 0 and L/(1 − L) < 1 we write
2L−ρð Þ þ L
1−L
 1−ρ
2Lþ ρ−2ð Þ≤ 2L−ρð Þ þ L
1−L
2Lþ ρ−2ð Þ ¼ ρ 2L−1
1−L
≤0; ðA13Þ
which, together with − Lρ(1 − L) < 0, implies− Lρ 1−Lð Þ 2L−ρð Þ þ L 1−Lð Þρ 2Lþ ρ−2ð Þð Þ > 0 for 0 < ρ
< 1 and L∈ 0; 0:5ð Þ: ðA14Þ
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L
 1−ρ
2L−ρð Þ þ 2Lþ ρ−2ð Þ
 !
; ðA15Þ
− (Lρ(1 − L)(2L − ρ) + L(1 − L)ρ(2L + ρ − 2)) < 0 for 0 < ρ < 1 and L ∈ (0.5, 1).
That d2G(L)/dL2 > 0 for any L ∈ (0, 0.5) (G(L) is strictly convex) and d2G(L)/dL2 < 0
for any L ∈ (0.5, 1) (G(L) is strictly concave), dG(L)/dL < 0 for L→ 1 or L→ 0 and dG
(L)/dL > 0 for L = α1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ) = 0.5, and the continuity of dG(L)/dL for L ∈ (0, 1)
imply the uniqueness of the extrema and the properties of dG(L)/dL for α = 1.
To extend the argument to the case where α > 1, for dG(L)/dL = 0 to have at most two




ρ−1 1−Lð Þραρþ1 ρ−1ð Þ
L−1ð Þ L−1ð ÞLρα−L 1−Lð Þραρð Þ3 L−1
ð ÞLρα −2Lþ ρð Þ þ L 1−Lð Þραρ −2þ 2Lþ ρð Þð Þ
ðA16Þ
and
L−1ð ÞLρα −2Lþ ρð Þ þ L 1−Lð Þραρ −2þ 2Lþ ρð Þ






We need to show that
H Lð Þ ¼ 2L−ρþ L
1−Lð Þα
 1−ρ
2Lþ ρ−2ð Þ ¼ 0
has at most one solution within L ∈ (0, 1) for α > 1 and 0 < ρ < 1. For this to be true it suf-
fices that H (L) is monotonous for L ∈ (0, 1), that is, for L′ > L it must be that H(L′) >H(L).







2L′ þ ρ−2  > 2L−ρþ L
1−Lð Þα
 1−ρ
2Lþ ρ−2ð Þ; ðA18Þ
which is:
2 L′−L














2L1 þ ρ−2ð Þ− L21−L2ð Þ
 1−ρ
2L2 þ ρ−2ð Þ
 !
ðA20Þ
is non-negative. If the term in equation (A20) is negative, we already know that the
inequality in equation (A19) holds for α = 1. As αρ–1 is decreasing for α ∈ (1,∞), that the
term in equation (A20) is negative and the fact that the inequality in equation (A19) holds
for α = 1 imply that the inequality in equation (A19) holds for a negative (A20), too.
Given their continuity, d2G(L)/dL2 = 0 has at most one and dG(L)/dL = 0 at most two
solutions and thus G(L) has at most two interior extrema within L ∈ (0, 1). We already
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at least one maximum on L ∈ (α1− 1/ρ/(1 + α1− 1/ρ), 1). Therefore, these extrema are unique
and we denote L1 ∈ (0, α
1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ)) the minimum and L2 ∈ (α
1 − 1/ρ/(1 + α1 − 1/ρ), 1)
the maximum. It also follows that L1 < L
* < L2, where L
* = α1− 1/ρ/(1 + α1− 1/ρ).
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